The Stabilization and Structural Adjustment Procedures of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank by Reznick, Douglas A.
Eastern Illinois University
The Keep
Masters Theses Student Theses & Publications
1995
The Stabilization and Structural Adjustment
Procedures of the International Monetary Fund
and the World Bank
Douglas A. Reznick
Eastern Illinois University
This research is a product of the graduate program in Economics at Eastern Illinois University. Find out more
about the program.
This is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Theses & Publications at The Keep. It has been accepted for inclusion in Masters Theses
by an authorized administrator of The Keep. For more information, please contact tabruns@eiu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Reznick, Douglas A., "The Stabilization and Structural Adjustment Procedures of the International Monetary Fund and the World
Bank" (1995). Masters Theses. 1991.
https://thekeep.eiu.edu/theses/1991
THESIS REPRODUCTION CERTIFICATE 
TO: Graduate Degree Candidates (who have written formal theses) 
SUBJECT: Permission to Reproduce Theses 
The University Library is rece1v1ng a number of requests from other institutions 
asking permission to reproduce dissertations for inclusion in their library 
holdings. Although no copyright laws are involved, we feel that professional 
courtesy demands that permission be obtained from the author before we allow 
theses to be copied. 
PLEASE SIGN ONE OF THE FOLLOWING STATEMENTS: 
Booth Library of Eastern Illinois University has my permission to lend my 
thesis to a reputable college or university for the purpose of copying it for 
inclusion in that institution's library or research holdings. 
0 P Author 
I respectfully request Booth Library of Eastern Illinois University not allow 
my thesis to be reproduced because: 
Author Date 
The Stabilization and Structural Adjustment Procedures 
of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank 
(TITLE) 
BY 
Douglas A. Reznick 
THESIS 
SUBMITIED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS 
FOR THE DEGREE OF 
Masters of Arts in Economics 
IN THE GRADUATE SCHOOL, EASTERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY 
CHARLESTON, ILLINOIS 
1995 
YEAR 
I HEREBY RECOMMEND THIS THESIS BE ACCEPTED AS FULFILLING 
THIS PART OF THE GRADUATE DEGREE CITED ABOVE 
DATE ADVISER 
DEPARTMENT HEAD 
Stabilization and S.A. 1 
The Stabilization and Structural Adjustment Procedures of the 
International Monetary Fund and the world Bank 
Douglas A. Reznick 
Eastern Illinois University 
Department of Economics 
Stabilization and S.A. 2 
Abstract 
The IMF and the World Bank began to attach structural 
adjustment restrictions to many of their loans to developing 
countries in the early 1980s. Some of these restrictions are 
not based on solid economic ground and are, in many cases not 
effective in improving the economic standing of the countries 
that receive loans. In addition, there was also a 
misdiagnosis of the problems that occurred in the 
underdeveloped countries of the world. Under the IMF/World 
Bank paradigm, the difficulties that most underdeveloped 
countries experienced were due to internal distortions and 
non-effective development strategies. Evidence to the 
contrary shows that many of the problems that these 
underdeveloped nations experienced in the 1970s and early 
1980s were mainly exogenous and out of the control of the 
individual countries, such as: Two severe oil shocks, a 
world wide recession, and increased real interest rates. 
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Chapter 1: 
Components of Stabilization and Structural Adjustment 
Programs Imposed by the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund 
Introduction 
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
otherwise known as the world Bank (WB or the Bank) emerged 
out of the Bretton Woods Conference in 1944. The stated 
intent was to help foster more economic "openness" around the 
world. The IMF's policy was to loan nations (mostly war 
ravaged European nations after World War II) money to assist 
with balance-of-payments difficulties and interest owed to 
other banks for previous loans (George and Sebelli, 1994, p. 
10). The World Bank was mainly concerned with providing 
loans for specific development projects, and with the 
reconstruction of Europe and Japan 
Soon after its inception, the World Bank quickly became 
the largest supplier of infrastructure to the underdeveloped 
world (George and Sebelli, 1994, p. 2). However, in later 
years, critics have seen flaws in their policies. The Bank's 
policies have dislocated entire conununities, destroyed large 
sections of forests, turned grasslands to desert, and 
transferred land and wealth to the hands of a few rich 
farmers and entrepreneurs -- all in the name of development 
(George and Sebelli, p. 2). 
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When the world Bank first arrived on the international 
scene, the focus for loans was to help borrowing countries 
with specific difficulties in their infrastructure. Between 
the years of 1961 and 1965, 76.8% of all WB loans were for 
electric power or for transportation, and only 6% of these 
loans were for agricultural development projects (Ayers, 
1983, p. 2). This focus later changed to projects that 
placed emphasis on the natural resources of the economy. In 
many countries the emphasis was on agriculture production and 
export. In countries like Mexico, the emphasis was on fossil 
fuels such as oil. 
When Robert McNamara became President of the World Bank, 
he began a move toward agricultural investment. He saw that 
agricultural investment for exports was the way for these 
countries to get their people out of poverty (Ayers, 1983, p. 
2). However, in many cases the end effect was that the 
agricultural workers/owners he "intended" to help were 
devastated. This was in part due to IMF/WB recommended 
policy changes and because of exogenous economic factors that 
caused agricultural prices to bottom out. 
Over the years, restrictions attached to the loans have 
also changed. In the early stages, loans were given with few 
restrictions. They were mainly concerned with the country's 
debt service ratio. This was the ratio of a country's 
interest and amortization payments on its' public and 
publicly guaranteed debt to the country's earnings from 
exports of goods and services (Ayers, 1983, p. 3). Beginning 
L 
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in the late 1970s and early 1980s, most loans were given with 
conditions. In exchange for the money (which they still had 
to repay with interest) the borrowing countries would agree 
to certain stipulations, which would move their economies to 
be more open and "market friendly." 
It was (and still is) the belief that if these economies 
were forced to adhere to these new IMF/WB economic standards 
that they would foster growth and push these countries 
further up the development hill. In my opinion, the IMF and 
the World Bank have not succeeded in their tasks in many 
areas of the world. Also, in many cases, the negative 
externalities associated with IMF/WB policies have exceeded 
the supposed gain. 
The 1991 World Development Report defines economic 
development as, nA sustainable increase in living standards 
that encompasses material consumption, education, health, and 
environmental protection" (World Bank, 1991, p. 31). The 
publishers of the WDR, namely the World Bank, believe that 
countries who achieve rapid and successful development 
exhibit two characteristics: They invest in the education of 
men and women, i.e. human capital; and from these human 
capital investments the country achieves a high level of 
productivity by giving leading roles to markets, competition, 
and foreign trade (Fanelli, Frenkel, and Taylor, 1992, p. 1). 
Theoretically, these general beliefs are then molded into 
policy provisions. However it is ironic, given the 1991 
WDR's definition of development, that in many cases the 
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IMF/WB policies actually force the project countries to cut 
back on human capital investments rather than to embrace it 
as a necessity for development. 
At the outset of their creation, the roles of the IMF 
and the World Bank were quite different. The function of the 
International Monetary Fund was to extend short-term balance-
of-payments support to countries experiencing temporary 
payment difficulties (Payer, 1982, p. 103). The world Bank, 
on the other hand, was supposed to lend funds for economic 
development (Payer, p. 109). The WB would lend funds for 
specific development projects such as transportation 
improvements or new electrical power facilities (Payer, 
p. 109). Although their missions were different, the two 
institutions sometimes worked hand in hand. 
Over the years the provisions associated with receiving 
IMF loans changed. They (IMF/WB) began to insist on 
increasing levels of economic restructuring. Around 1980, 
the IMF began to issue loans with a specific package of 
economic "improvements." Table 1.1 gives a good 
representation of the economic policies the IMF/WB insisted 
on. 
In recent years the relationship between these 
institutions has been solidifying and their loan processes 
have become more aligned. The world Bank began making loans 
which held to the standards of the new IMF restructuring 
policies. These new (late 1970s and early 1980s) World Bank 
loans were called "non-project" loans (Payer, 1982, p. 109). 
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This newly introduced cooperation intensified in 1988 when 
the Structural Adjustment Facility (SAF) was created (Bello, 
1994, p. 30). This organization was set up to oversee the 
economic policies set in place by the IMF/WB's technocrats 
(Bello, p. 30). 
The unification of the IMF and the world Bank treatments 
came to be known to its patients as "shock therapy" or 
the simultaneous application of short term stabilization 
measures and more long-term structural reforms. It was 
not without reason that adjusting countries came to 
label the two institutions with derision as the "Bretton 
Woods Twins" (Bello, p. 30). 
In addition to the loan conditions listed in Table 1.1, 
the country had to agree to stringent monitoring by the Bank 
and/or the IMF in order to ensure the country met the agreed 
upon targets (Bello, 1994, p. 27). These targets were 
specific figures that the IMF/WB wanted the country to reach 
by "improvements" in specific areas of the economy. Namely, 
the current account balances, fiscal balances, trade 
balances, and monetary balances. 
After agreements were reached, the payments could begin. 
However, the disbursements of the loans were made in 
increments. If the country would fail to meet the "targets" 
or fail to cooperate in the reform procedures, then the 
IMF/WB could hold back payments or refrain from issuing any 
Stabilization and S.A. 10 
further loans. Because these reforms covered such a broad 
economic area and were so radically different (relative to 
the previous economic policies), these loans essentially 
meant that they were turning over control of the entire 
economy to the IMF/WB (Bello, p. 27). 
Table 1.1 
Typical Conditionally for IMF/WB Loans 
Area of Reform Suggested Reform WB/IMF's Rationale for 
the Reform 
* the country must reduce * this refollll would reduce 
Fiscal Policy fiscal deficits by decreasing inflation and reduce the 
government expenditures (in demand for capital inflows 
practice this means cutting fran abroad 
spending in: health, education 
and welfare) 
* lift export restrictions * encourages exports, helps to 
improve trade imbalances and 
seen as a good source of 
Trade Policy qrowth 
* institute incentives for * encourages exports, helps to 
danestic export industries improve trade imbalances and 
seen as a good source of 
qrowth 
* liberalize quantitative * strengthen the 
import restrictions and cut canpetitiveness of danestic 
import tariffs industries as well as :improve 
industrv efficiency 
* devalue danestic currency * promotes export oriented 
Monetary Policy (relative to hard currencies) strategy (i.e. : makes exports 
more affordable/canpetitivel 
* :improve regulatory framework * :improves confidence in the 
(i.e. deregulate industry) system 
Financial Sector 
* relax interest rate ceilings * provides incentives for 
(allow/pressure interest rates efficient use of resources 
to rise) and reserve 
reauirements 
* eliminate restrictions on * makes danestic production 
foreiqn investment in industry and business activity more 
Industrial sector and financial services efficient due to the presence 
of foreiqn canpetition 
* remove Drice controls * ImDroves resource allocation 
* derequlate agricultural * help the agricultural sector 
Agricultural Policy trade and lift any price becane more efficient and to 
controls encouracre exnorts 
Note. From Bello, 1994, p. 27 and Reed, 1992, p. 27. 
L_ 
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The overall intent of these structural reforms was to 
make the economy more internationally "market friendly." The 
1991 World Development Report, entitled "The Challenge of 
Development", cites several studies including those by 
Bhagwati (1978) and Kruger (1978) to demonstrate that free-
market ("non-distorted") economies are the best environments 
for fostering a desirable level of development (Fanelli et 
al., 1992, p. 1). 
However, Fanelli, Frenkel, and Taylor have countered 
that the 1991 World Development Report's (i.e. the World 
Bank's) argument for their policies has "both loose ends and 
missing information" (Fanelli et al., 1992, p. 2). An 
example of this would be, blaming the underdeveloped 
countries for their severe debt accumulation on governmental 
inefficiencies and ineffective government policies, while 
ignoring the international conditions effect on these 
economies. The World Bank conducted research with hopes of 
explaining the causes behind the developing countries' 
difficulties in the mid to late 1970s. They conducted an 
analysis of sixty-eight developing countries, and they 
analyzed the impact of labor and capital on the level of 
output. 
Since the sum of the contributions of those two factors 
of productivity (labor and capital) fails to account for 
overall growth, the residual or "total factor 
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productivity" (TFP) growth is identified with the 
efficiency of using inputs - in standard neoclassical 
fashion. The WDR (World Development Report) tries to 
explain variations in residual "efficiency" in terms of 
the market friendliness of economic policy (Fanelli et 
al., 1992, p. 2). 
The 1991 WDR also singles out other factors for 
determining growth, and the first and most important of these 
is education. The WDR statement that the returns from 
education are high is largely indisputable (World Bank, 1991, 
p. 43). 
The second factor is the domestic policy adopted. 
Specifically, the WB believes that a strategy of import-
substituting industrialization (ISI) is detrimental to long 
run development. ISI strategies according to the World Bank 
have, for the most part, experienced disappointing results 
because, among other factors, protected industries have 
failed to mature and the anti-export bias from protection has 
impeded growth in exports especially in the area of 
agriculture (World Bank, 1991, p. 42). Fanelli et al. found 
in the 1991 WDR (p. 45) that, "A strategy of import-
substituting industrialization may artificially increase 
investment at the outset but may have grave long-term costs 
in terms of low efficiency and slow technical progress, i.e. 
low productivity growth" (Fanelli et al., 1992, p. 2). 
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In many cases this philosophy fails to hold much weight. 
As I will discuss in Chapter 3, countries like Mexico 
experienced their best rates of growth under ISI strategies. 
In the ISI years from 1965 through 1980, the country 
experienced an average growth rate of 6.5% per year (World 
Bank figures from the 1988 WDR). Mexico has failed to come 
close to those figures since then. 
The third suggested WB factor necessary to obtain growth 
and high productivity is external openness (Fanelli et al., 
1992, p. 2). The fourth WB factor is that economic 
instability diminishes the return of investment and growth of 
output (World Bank, 1991, p. 42). 
The WB's fifth growth contributing factor is one I have 
great difficulty in rationalizing or accepting. According to 
the WB, "external factors such as changes in terms of trade, 
growth of OECD economies, international interest rates, and 
capital flows are asserted not to account for differences in 
the performance of individual countries" (Fanelli et al, 
1992, p. 2). Although the 1991 WDR does not provide much 
supporting evidence for this claim (see the effects of 
external factors page 46-47 in the 1991 WDR), it does however 
cite one case study. They cite a bank sponsored research 
project by Mitra et al. (1991) which found no statistical 
association between exogenous factors, such as those 
mentioned above, and the level of output (World Bank, 1991, 
p. 42). However, as will be shown in Chapter 2, there is 
overwhelming evidence to the contrary. 
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The 1991 WDR compares the 1960-1973 and the 1973-1987 
periods. They argue that slower output growth almost 
everywhere after 1973 was due to a lower residual, or a less 
friendly atmosphere for investment (World Bank, 1991, p. 43 & 
45). As I will argue later in this paper, this view that the 
problems that the Third World experienced in the 1970s were 
caused by their own "unfriendly markets" or by inefficiency 
in production, is flawed. Exogenous factors such as the 
Third World debt crisis, two oil price shocks, and two world 
wide recessions had a detrimental effect on the Third World 
economies and have been major factors in their difficulties. 
Stabilization Procedures 
The IMF/WB loans came with two sets of conditions: 
Policies intended to bring about economic stabilization, and 
policies which insist on significant economic structural 
changes. The stabilization policies focus on cutting the 
inflation rate and the trade deficit by restricting aggregate 
demand through cutting governmental expenditures, and through 
monetary restrictions (Taylor, 1994, p. 40-41). 
Without fundamental changes in international credit 
conditions there is still a risk that IMF-inspired 
adjustment policies will drive their recipients toward 
prolonged "stabilized stagnation," because these 
policies ignore crucial macroeconomic factors such as 
linked foreign exchange and fiscal constraints, 
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financial fragility, and the dynamics of the inflation 
process (Fanelli et al., p. 15). 
For example, the IMF/WB paradigm operates on the 
assumption that increases in prices are caused by increases 
in the money supply. If the price increases are caused by 
supply rigidities, then tightening the money supply is the 
wrong prescription. 
The 1991 WDR states on page 8 that when government 
spending has gone too far (excessive years of fiscal 
deficits), the result is excessive borrowing, overvaluation 
of the currency, a high level of inflation, and a loss of 
export competitiveness (World Bank, 1991, p. 8). This view 
follows the logic that fiscal equilibrium is sufficient and 
necessary to bring about stabilization. Following this path 
can be very dangerous, "because it ignores structural 
features linking the saving, external and fiscal gaps and 
thereby understates the complexity of stabilization, 
especially if stagnation is to be avoided" (Fanelli et al., 
1992, p. 15). 
The second feature of the stabilization process is 
monetary policy "reform." Over the last fifteen to twenty 
years, unsustainable current account positions, governmental 
instability, financial crashes, capital flight, and high 
levels of inflation or hyper-inflation (particularly Latin 
America) have been the salient features of economic 
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instability in the underdeveloped world (Fanelli, et al., 
1992, p. 16). 
The 1991 WDR does acknowledge that these difficulties 
can be part of the economic problems of the underdeveloped 
world, in the short run, but there is little discussed about 
it. The long-term effects of these difficulties are not 
recognized (see 1991 WDR p. 44-45). 
Despite the acknowledgment that these problems can have 
detrimental short-run effects on the economy, a major reform 
is the devaluation of the domestic currency relative to hard 
currencies. This generally has the obvious economic effects: 
Imports become more expensive and therefore citizens can not 
afford what they once did (e.g.: U.S. exports to Mexico have 
fallen in 1994-95 due to devaluation's of the Peso); exports 
become cheaper; anyone (primarily the low income sectors) 
who holds domestic currency (as opposed to capital or hard 
currencies) has less buying value now and cannot afford to 
buy as much food/commodities as they once did, let alone save 
anything. 
The third stabilization procedure is an effort to bring 
about anti-inflationary policies. The WB places a high 
priority on this (Fanelli et al., 1992, p. 17). 
Fanelli, Frenkel and Taylor lay out five general methods 
of reducing inflation on p. 17-18. 
(~) Relative prices can be manipulated. e.g.: the 
exchange rate can be allowed to appreciate in real terms 
Stabilization and S.A. 17 
or the real wage to fall (by allowing the nominal 
exchange rate or wage to rise less rapidly than a 
general index of prices). 
(~) Imports can be increased to ease local supply 
bottlenecks. Often, purchases abroad must be financed 
by the central bank as it spends reserves to support an 
exchange rate pegged as a price anchor. 
(~) Income policies and other forms of market 
intervention can be deployed to muff le the most 
conflicting social claims. The most obvious is the 
"social pact" to reduce wage inflation while holding 
profit claims in line. 
(Q) In a more extreme case, a price freeze plus 
contract deindexation - "heterodox shock" in the jargon 
- can be attempted as a policy surprise. 
(~) Austerity can be applied, i.e.: a cut in the 
government expenditures coupled with the monetary 
restriction based on increased interest rates and credit 
restraint. 
As seen in Table 1.1, the IMF/WB usually leans toward 
the austerity approach (cut government expenditures, 
devaluation, and increase domestic interest rates). 
Obviously each one the above five techniques is unique, just 
as each one of the Third World countries is unique. I find 
it far fetched to believe that the austerity approach is the 
only effective approach. Perhaps it would be more prudent to 
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examine each country individually and to then determine the 
best course for action. As noted by Lance Taylor, austerity 
is more effective in economies in which prices are free-
f loating, which does not describe many of the Third World 
countries in question (Taylor, 1994, p. 58). 
In actual practice, the IMF combines austerity with real 
wage cuts and reductions in income support programs and 
subsidies (for the poor and needy) (Taylor, 1994, p. 58). 
The end result is a reduction in demand (partly due to laid 
off workers), output contraction, and a lower trade deficit 
(due to the decrease in imports because the people can no 
longer afford them due to the devaluation of the currency and 
because of their lower income) all in the name of inflation 
fighting (Fanelli et al., 1992, p. 18). 
It is not just the fiscal restraint approach that can 
harm individuals. The real problem exists when policies such 
as austerity are combined with domestic currency devaluation, 
efforts to raise interest rates, and the elimination of 
income support programs. This hits the poor 
disproportionately. First with respect to the devaluation, 
since low-income sectors generally hold much of their wealth 
in cash (domestic currency), their "nest egg" is now not 
worth what it used to be. Then the government is forced to 
cut expenditures including food assistance programs, health 
assistance programs, and small business (like small farmers) 
assistance. Then interest rates are pushed up, which 
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discourages the poor from applying for loans for a small 
business or to buy a tractor (a technological improvement). 
As an example, the implementation of austerity programs 
in Latin America has resulted in reduced levels of earnings 
for the working class. Between 1980 and 1985, the average 
per capita income in 23 Latin American countries fell 9% 
while austerity were implemented (this was also due to the 
world recession from 1980-82) (Hakkert & Goza, 1989, p. 74). 
On an individual country basis other workers have been 
devastated. In Costa Rica, during the implementation of an 
austerity program, real wages fell 40% between 1979 and 1982. 
Exchange rate policy is the fourth procedure necessary, 
according to the IMF/WB philosophy for economic 
stabilization. The 1991 WDR states that it is necessary to 
maintain a competitive exchange rate, in order to close the 
external gap (balance of payment difficulty) and this 
involves an early devaluation (Fanelli et al., 1992, p. 18). 
The costs associated with importing goods have now gone up 
because of the "weaker" domestic currency. 
"Problems arise in coordinating devaluation with other 
policies, in both stabilization and adjustment contexts" 
(Taylor, 1994, p. 59). If this process of devaluation is 
combined with a expansionary policy, it could be very 
beneficial for the economy (Fanelli et al., 1992, p. 19). 
But this is not the case under the IMF/WB paradigm. As shown 
in Table 1.1, a key element to the program is that government 
budgets must be slashed for the benefit of a balanced budget. 
L_ 
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When contractionary fiscal policy is combined with currency 
devaluation the outcome can be devastating. 
When devaluation is added to this policy of monetary and 
fiscal austerity to promote exports and earn foreign 
exchange, it escalates the contractionary effects by 
raising the local cost of imported capital and 
intermediate goods, leading to the policy "overkill" for 
which the IMF is justly famous (or infamous] (Bello, 
1994, p. 36). 
This economic contraction scares off private domestic 
investment and if left to itself, the economy usually does 
not provide signals to renew investor confidence in the 
economy (Bello, p. 36). 
The 1991 WDR defines stabilization procedures as methods 
that "work mainly on the demand side to reduce inflation and 
external deficits," while "structural policies are concerned 
with the supply side; they address the efficiency of 
resource use, the emphasizing of reforms in specific sectors 
-- especially trade, finance, and industry" (World Bank, 
1991, p. 113). 
Structural Change 
Liberalization of trade is one of the IMF/WB's 
priorities in their structural reform procedures. The IMF/WB 
believe that the "free market" approach is absolutely 
L 
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necessary in order to solve the problems of underdeveloped 
"distorted" economies. Others feel that trade liberalization 
should be a less important procedure, or not a procedure at 
all, in order to bring about growth and prosperity to these 
underdeveloped countries. "Trade policy orientation, while 
important, may not be a dominant determinant of growth and 
may not therefore deserve the attention the World Bank and 
others have given it" (Hellinger, 1990, p. 884). 
Walden Bello echoes these arguments; he also argues that 
trade liberalization does not spark investment and growth. 
He uses the example of the agricultural sector. The IMF/WB 
philosophy focuses on lifting price controls on commodities 
and ignores the more important deep rooted problems such as: 
structural, technological, and infrastructural deficiencies 
that must be addressed in order to increase efficiency and 
productivity (Bello, 1994, p. 36). The difficulties are 
usually addressed by way of state-supported programs, which 
are being slashed in order to bring about fiscal equilibrium 
(Bello, 1994, p. 36). Bello cites cases in Africa in which 
the WB, through their deregulatory policies, allows the free 
market to determine the price for fertilizers. In many cases 
this led to reduced applications, lower yields, and lower 
agricultural investment because of the absence of state-
supported credit systems (Bello, p. 36). 
Why has the IMF/WB placed such a high priority on the 
removal of any "market distorting" trade policies? Fanelli, 
Frenkel and Taylor (1992) seem to feel that the IMF/WB 
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rationale is based on textbook theories. The World Bank uses 
the example of a country that has been under long-term IS! 
strategy. This country usually exhibits a high and 
complicated tariff structure and/or strict import quotas 
(Fanelli et al., 1992, p. 21). Most economists feel that 
this complicated protectionist structure could be simplified, 
streamlined and reduced, but how far to go and how quickly 
are the questions that are very controversial. The IMF/WB 
policies require a swift and severe approach to reduce trade 
restrictions. 
Fanelli et al. suggest that the problem with the IMF/WB 
paradigm is the set of underlying assumptions. For instance, 
consider the belief that the free-market will alleviate 
market distortions and inefficiencies. As Fanelli describes 
it, uTheir deficiencies lie in the incompatibilities between 
their underlying assumptions and the world as it really 
functions" (Fanelli et al., 1992, p. 22). In the real world 
the free-market can lead to distortions such as trans-
national corporations, local monopolies, and the divide-and-
rule tactics of the domestic entrepreneurs that take severe 
advantages of labor (Fanelli et al., 1992, p. 22). 
Also the IMF/WB's empirical basis relies on models with 
assumptions of full employment and investment determined by 
savings (Taylor, 1994, p. 66). When protectionism is placed 
into an investment-driven growth model, it can be easily lead 
to faster overall expansion (Fanelli et al., 1992, p. 22). 
Obviously protectionism can be effectively utilized, which is 
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more than can be said for the orthodox reforms demonstrated 
in Argentina in the late 1970s. The IMF/WB got their signals 
wrong, and their reforms led to aborted economic growth for 
at least a decade (Taylor, p. 66). 
Economist David Evans uses Chile as an example of 
effective protectionism. The governments protection of the 
fruit, forestry, and fishing industries led to an economic 
export boom in 1985 (Evans, 1991, p. 10). This was done in 
part through governmental support of technological 
investments, financial support through subsidized loans, and 
through informational/educational means. This was a relief 
after 12 years of disastrous stabilization supported by the 
IMF/WB (Evans, 1991, p. 12). 
Although there have been protectionist failures too, the 
point is that there should be debate over the issue for each 
individual country, because it is not such a cut and dry 
situation as the IMF/WB lays out. One of the key intents of 
a liberalized market is to increase technical efficiency. 
Rodrick suggests that if "truth in advertising were to apply 
to policy advice, each prescription for trade liberalization 
would be accompanied with a disclaimer: warning! Trade 
liberalization cannot be shown to enhance technical 
efficiency; nor has it been empirically demonstrated to do 
so" (Fanelli et al., 1992, p. 23). 
Another reform in the IMF/WB philosophy is financial 
reform. The basic strategy is to increase interest rates and 
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deregulate the financial system which would in turn increase 
allocative efficiency (Fanelli et al., 1992, p. 23). 
"Just as price liberalization does not ensure that firms will 
efficiently produce commodities there is no particular reason 
to expect that removing wedges separating rates of return 
will guarantee a low-cost supply of financial services" 
(Fanelli et al., p. 23). At times, when applied, this 
financial reform leads to reduced efficiency in finance, 
which lead to increased credit costs (Fanelli et al., 
p. 23). This is true in part because the IMF/WB method of 
removal of state interventions/distortions at times leads to 
market distortions such as monopolies and oligopolies which 
have great power in the control of credit. Because of the 
lack of competition the financial institutions take advantage 
of their market power and charge excessive rates. Also, a 
rise in interest rates may lead to a decrease in domestic 
investments and capital improvements, thus contracting the 
economy. 
In addition, the policy of financial reform becomes 
difficult in the context of other loan restrictions. "Reform 
of the financial sector often calls for distressed financial 
institutions to be restructured; in the short-run this may 
raise public spending and make it harder to cut the budget 
deficit" (World Bank, 1991, p. 115). 
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Chapter 2: 
Was there a Misdiagnosis of the Problems in the Third 
World and Were the Rew Adjustment Procedures 
the wrong Prescription? 
During the late 1970s and early 1980s many countries of 
the underdeveloped world began to experience significant 
difficulties. They began to have serious debt burdens, 
declining levels of export earnings, increasing fiscal 
deficits, increased levels of inflation, increasing levels of 
unemployment, as well as slower economic growth. Why were 
these countries having such great difficulties? 
The IMF's economists have blamed the governments for all 
of the problems experienced by Latin America in the pre-1982 
period (Pastor, 1993, p. 291). They point to restrictive 
trade practices, price supports, fiscal expansion and 
exchange rate overvaluation (Pastor, p. 291). As discussed 
in Chapter 1 the WB describes it as a high level of 
"inefficiency" or in other words it was due to an increased 
level of ''market distortions." 
It is true that the governmental policies and their 
management are partly to blame for these problems. But to 
point to governmental management of the economy (as indicated 
by the IMF/WB philosophy) as the sole reason for the 
difficulties is just not realistic. Other factors on the 
international economic scene during this time period had 
their effects. Is it possible that exogenous factors such as 
Stabilization and S.A. 26 
severe amounts of Third World debt accumulation, a world-wide 
recession, two severe oil shocks, an overall drop in 
agricultural commodity prices had an effect on these Third 
World countries? My answer is yes. These external factors 
did play a major role in the problems associated with the 
underdeveloped world. 
The IMF/WB's view was that the difficulties in the 
"South" were internal and that serious adjustment needed to 
be made. Structural adjustment was introduced in 
1980 by Robert s. McNamara, formally the U.S. Secretary of 
Defense, and then the President of the World Bank (George and 
Sabelli, 1994, p. 58). This structural adjustment (SAP) 
would become a requirement if a country wished to receive 
financial assistance from either the World Bank or the IMF 
(George and Sebelli, p. 58). Also the power of the IMF and 
the WB wield is evidented from the fact that if these 
countries refused to accept this SAP, other private financial 
institutions would likewise generally refuse to loan funds to 
these countries. In order to deal with an increasing debt 
burden, many countries were left without an alternative. 
One of the obvious exogenous factors that should be 
considered, is the debt crisis of the Third World. The 
growing debt crisis surfaced visibly and unavoidably in 1982, 
when Mexico threatened default on their debt (Walton and 
Seddon, 1994, p. 15). As Table 2.1 indicates, non-oil 
exporting developing countries began accumulating large 
amounts of debt by the late 1970s and the early 1980s. Total 
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external debt increased nearly five fold between 1973 and 
1982 (Cline, 1984, p. 1). When adjusted for inflation, the 
total debt does not look as severe, but none the less there 
is a 210% increase in total debt over this time period 
(Cline, p. 1). 
Table 2.1 
Indicators of External Debt of Non-oil Exporting Developing 
Countries 1973-1982 (Billions of Dollars> 
1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 
Exte:rnal debt: 
Total 130.1 160.8 190.8 228.0 278.5 336.3 396.9 474.0 550.0 
Loner Term 118.8 138.1 163.5 194.9 235.9 286.6 338.1 388.5 452.8 
Total('75 prices) 169.0 175.7 190.8 218.0 250.9 281.0 294.7 308.6 331.3 
Excorts 112.7 153. 7 155.9 181. 7 220.3 258.3 333.0 419.8 444.4 
Debt/Exports ( % ) 115.4 104.6 122.4 125.5 126.4 130.2 119.2 121.9 124.9 
Debt service/ 
excorts (%) 
ReDOrted 15.9 14.4 16.1 15.3 15.4 19.0 19.0 17.6 20.4 
Adiusted N/A -1.6 6.5 10.5 9.4 11.0 6.9 4.9 11. 7 
Debt/GDP (%) 22.4 21.8 23.8 25.7 27.4 28.5 27.5 27.6 31.0 
Oil as a % of 5.9 12.6 13.3 15.6 15.1 13.9 16.2 20.4 21.0 
imcorts 
Note. From Cline, 1984, p. 2-3. Exports were goods and 
1982 
612.4 
499.6 
357.8 
427.4 
143.3 
23.9 
22.3 
34.7 
19.9 
services only. Debt service figures include interest but not 
amortization on short term debt. The adjusted figures for 
debt service as a percentage of exports subtracted the 
inflationary erosion of debt. 
One could point to the fact that export earnings have 
also increased four fold over this time period. But, this is 
less convincing when debt-service burden as opposed to debt 
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itself is calculated (Cline, 1984, p. 2). The debt service 
burden became a problem primarily because of rising interest 
rates. Debt service (interest on short and long term debt 
plus amortization on long term debt) rose from 15.9% of 
exports of goods and services in 1973 to 24% in 1982 (Cline, 
1984, p. 3). 
The overall trend in Table 2.1 shows that while the 
increase in debt burden is not as severe when measured in the 
real terms relative to the export base (Cline, 1984, p. 4). 
But, by 1981 the burden of debt rose significantly according 
to three principle measures: Ratio of debt to exports, real 
(adjusted) debt service ratios, and ratio of debt to GDP 
(Cline, p. 4). In the following year 1982, these burdens 
rose even further to levels never experienced before (Cline, 
p. 4). Despite these warning signs, the massive accumulation 
of debt in the Third World continued during the 1980s. 
The problem is seen more clearly when the countries 
involved in the debt crisis are broken down into income 
categories. Middle income countries as a whole increased 
their debt to GDP ratio from 36.1% in 1980 to 46.1% in 1989. 
Lower-middle income countries increased their debt to GDP 
ratio from 37.7% to 67.7% (Walton and Seddon, 1994, p. 15). 
However, the most shocking figures are seen in the lower-
income category (other than India and China). These 
countries increased their ratio from 27.0% in 1980 to 71.0% 
in 1989 (Walton and Seddon, p. 16). 
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A primary cause of the sharp deterioration in growth in 
1982 was a decline in the nominal value (by 3.8%) of exports 
even as total debt continued to rise (10.3%) (Cline, 1984, p. 
5). Export stagnation was driven by three factors: A global 
recession (which caused export volume growth to decline), by 
appreciation of the U.S. dollar (which lowers the dollar 
value of export earnings), and by commodity price erosion 
(Cline, p. 5). As Table 2.1 illustrates, the issues 
surrounding debt burdens played an important role in plunging 
non-oil exporting countries further into trouble. A closer 
look at some selected countries up shows it played a much 
larger role. In Table 2.2 export growth of goods and 
services is compared to the LIBOR + 1%. The LIBOR (London 
Interbank Offer Rate) is an international interest rate which 
many international loans including many IMF/WB loans are set. 
For the most of 1973-80 period, the LIBOR + 1% averaged 
10.2%, while export growth averaged 21.1% (Cline, 1984, p. 
8). This growth in exports was obviously covering the 
average interest rate of 10.2% the country's were paying. 
The interest rate was being clearly met and overfulfilled. 
As the table indicates the first incident occurred in 
1975. Countries that were experiencing prosperous export 
activity (Argentina, Venezuela, Chile, and Mexico) were 
plunged into severe export difficulties. The 1975 downturn 
would turn out to be quite deep, and at the time was the most 
severe economic downturn since the Great Depression (Cooper, 
1992, p. 2). The market eventually recover by the year 1978. 
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Table 2.2 
Export Growth Compared With Interest Rates, 
1973-1982 (Export Growth is in a Percentage Form> 
1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 
LIBOR + 1 oercent 10.2 12.0 8.0 6.6 7.0 9.7 13.0 15.4 17.5 
Export growth, 
nominal 
non-oil LDC's N/A. 36.4 1.4 16.5 21.2 17.2 28.9 26.1 5.8 
net oil imcorters N/A. 33.1 1.6 16.3 21.9 16.9 26.8 24.2 5.4 
net oil exporters N/A. 57.3 -0.1 18.9 18.8 18.0 40.4 35.4 7.8 
Brazil 56.1 33.2 6.1 13.5 19.7 7.2 24.2 29.3 15. 7 
Mexico 26.8 31.6 -0.2 13.3 14.0 39.1 40.2 54.3 21.9 
Argentina 61.6 25.8 -23.9 30.8 43.6 16.3 26.6 13.0 5.1 
Korea 85.6 29.4 9.7 60.8 38.2 31.3 13.8 15.6 21. 7 
Venezuela 54.4 126.8 -15.7 2.8 5.5 -0.8 50.2 36.4 10.1 
Chile 49.0 60.1 -21. 7 31. 7 8.1 13.8 59.0 32.2 -2.6 
Note. From Cline, 1984, p. 6-7. Exports were goods and 
services only. 
But the problems of the downturn were not as severe as 
the one that occurred in 1981-1982. "The difference between 
the interest and export-growth was smaller (6.6% in 1975 
compared with an average of 14.8% in 1981-82), reflecting 
that the 1975 recession was shorter and less severe. 
1982 
14 .1 
-3.8 
-3.8 
-3.6 
-13.4 
7.3 
-15.7 
2.3 
-22.0 
-3.8 
Moreover, the relative severity of the debt burden was milder 
going into the 1975 recession (as measured by debt relative 
to exports and GDP, and the debt service ratio, Table 2.1)" 
(Cline, 1984, p. 8). 
The world recession in 1981-1982 period was in many 
respects more severe than the one experienced six years 
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before (Cooper, 1992, p. 4). This was due to the extremely 
high interest rates in the early 1980s, which can be seen by 
the movement of the LIBOR during this time period. 
Overall, the relative debt burden sharpened severely in 
the 1981-82 period, in addition to the milder recession of 
1975 (Cline, 1984, p. 8). The debt problems experienced were 
also affected by endogenous factors, such as: Interest rate 
decisions, domestic budgetary policies, governmental 
inefficiencies, and corruption. But it is quite clear that 
exogenous variables played a powerful role in accelerating 
the debt burdens. 
Another one of the exogenous factors that led to 
difficulties for these developing countries was the two oil 
shocks. This had the most powerful negative effect on their 
debt difficulties. 
In December of 1973 the Organization of Petroleum 
Exporting Countries (OPEC) ministers increased the market 
price of oil from $3.60 per barrel to $11.65 per barrel (a 
three fold increase) (Cooper, 1992, p. 1). In 1970 oil was 
only $1.35 per barrel (Cooper, p. 1). This began the first 
episode of international financial instability. This 
occurred at a time when the demand for oil was quite high 
because the world economic growth up to the 1972-73 period 
was quite rapid, as compared to post-1973. From 1968 to 1973 
the quantity of oil demanded increased from 19 million 
barrels per day to 30 million barrels per day (Cooper, p. 2). 
This was the largest per unit oil-shock ever experienced. 
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Cooper argues that we are still feeling the effects of the 
first oil shock today, in the form of accumulated debt and 
the memories of the subsequent turbulence (Cooper, p. 2). 
These effects will continue to affect policies for years to 
come (Cooper, p. 1). 
World oil markets had become relatively calm by mid-
1978, and oil prices had actually declined somewhat in real 
terms from 1974. Then turmoil developed in Iran. Oil field 
workers went on strike in December of 1978, which caused 
about five billion barrels of crude per day to be removed 
from the market (Cooper, 1992, p. 21). Oil workers 
eventually returned to work but production levels would never 
be as high as they were before. Subsequently, other 
producers reacted and oil prices rose again. At that time, 
there was great disagreement in the OPEC community about 
production levels and prices. By March of 1981 prices 
reached $33 per barrel. This was an increase of 150% over 
two years. 
Needless to say oil importing countries found themselves 
in great difficulties, much like they had experienced in the 
first shock. But, this time there were additional factors 
that made the situation much worse, including higher real 
interest rates. At the time, a great portion of their 
overall debt was maintained at market rates, rates that were 
unusually high. Their debt was usually pegged to the LIBOR 
(two-thirds of the Third world debt was pegged to the LIBOR) 
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or the U.S. prime rate (Cooper, 1992, p. 22). The LIBOR 
averaged 17.5% in 1981. 
Oil importing countries had some decisions to make. 
They had to decide how much to contract imports and how much 
to borrow to cover the additional import bill (Cooper, 1992, 
p. 22). In most cases, these oil importing countries found 
themselves in severe debt difficulty. Because of the 
instability in their respective countries and also the world 
wide recession, few private banks or institutions were 
willing to loan funds. These countries were forced to deal 
with the IMF/WB to get the necessary funds to cover their 
debts. 
The effect of relatively high oil prices and interest 
rates can also be seen by the value of oil imports to these 
Third World nations. As Table 2.1 indicates the value of oil 
imports rose from 6% of total merchandise imports in 1973 to 
20% in 1980-82 (Cline, 1984, p. 8). 
Table 2.3 shows the cumulative additional costs of oil 
imports on the oil importing developing countries (Cline, 
1984, p. 10). The second column shows actual net oil imports 
of these countries over the ten year time period, 1973-82. 
The third column shows the price that they would have paid if 
oil would not have risen more than the U.S. wholesale price 
index after 1973 (Cline, p. 10). As you can see by the 
table, the cumulative additional costs were $260 billion over 
the decade. 
L 
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Table 2.3 
Effect of Higher Oil Prices on Debt of Non-oil Developing 
Countries <Net Oil Importers Only> in Billions of Dollars 
Oil Imports Oil Imports Additional Cost 
Year Actual (A) Hypothetical CB) (C = A - B) 
1973 4.8 4.8 0.0 
1974 16.1 5.3 10.8 
1975 17.3 5.7 11.6 
1976 21.3 6.8 14.5 
1977 23.8 7.5 16.3 
1978 26.0 8.6 17.4 
1979 39.0 10.9 28.1 
1980 63.2 11.9 51.3 
1981 66.7 12.1 54.6 
1982 66.7 11.9 54.8 
Total: 1974-1982 344.9 85.5 259.5 
Note. From Cline, 1984, p. 10. Column B is based on the 
assumption that oil prices did not rise any more that U.S. 
wholesale prices. 
If we accept Cline's figures, then we have to recognize 
that oil-price increases alone accounted for over a fourth of 
the debt incurred by the Third World countries (George, 1988, 
p. 24) Obviously the effect was greater on the non-oil 
countries. 
Those outside the charmed circle of oil producers had no 
choice in the matter: Either they increased borrowing 
or they allowed their energy starved economies to come 
to a screeching halt. The option of paying for oil by 
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dramatically increasing their own exports was not open 
to them (George, p. 29). 
It is not entirely clear what the total effect of the 
oil shocks was on the developing countries' debt burden or 
the overall economic standing of the country. What is clear 
is that the effect was significantly negative, and these 
shocks should have been considered before the IMF/WB 
structural reforms were imposed. 
Two additional factors that were important in 
contributing to the crisis were the rise in interest rates 
and a world wide recession in the 1980-82 period. Borrowers 
had become adjusted to low real interest rates in the mid to 
late 1970s. Normally, interest rates are tied to inflation. 
They tended to rise and fall together (George, 1988, p. 28). 
But in the mid to late 1970s, interest rates did not rise as 
much as inflation, thus making the real rate negative 
(George, p. 28). In some years interest rates were as low as 
-3% to -4% in real terms (George, p. 28). 
But the rub was that in the 1980s interest rates didn't 
fall as much as inflation leaving debtors holding the bag 
(George, 1988, p. 28). Every additional point increase in 
the real interest rate caused the country to incur extra 
billions in debt service (anywhere from $2 billion to $6 
billion per point according to varied estimates) thus forcing 
these countries to get new loans to pay for their interest 
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payments (George, p. 28). It is easy to see why the 
indebtedness of these countries began to grow quickly. 
Coincidentally with the relatively higher interest 
rates, the international economy experienced a severe 
recession in 1980-82 (Cline, 1984, p. 12). uFrom 1973 to 
1979 real growth in industrial countries averaged 3.2% 
annually. It fell to 1.2% in 1980-81 and -0.3% in 1982" 
(Cline, p. 12). As a result of the slowdown, the developing 
countries experienced a drop in the prices of their primary 
exports. uwith 1980 = 100, export unit values fell to an 
index of 94 in 1981 and 90 for 1982 in non-oil developing 
countries" (Cline, p. 12). The resulting effect was a loss 
of $25 billion in export unit values and an import cost 
increase of $9.6 billion in 1981, and a loss of export unit 
value in 1982 of $44 billion, with no increase in 1982 import 
costs (Cline, p. 13). Cline then calculated the total loss 
to non-oil developing countries due to deteriorated terms of 
trade, for 1981-82 he estimated this loss to be $79 billion 
(Cline, p. 13). 
In addition, real export volumes (with constant prices) 
from developing countries fell as a result of the 
international recession. On average real export volume 
growth for non-oil developing countries averaged 8.1% from 
1971-80, rose to 9.9% in 1981, and in 1982 fell to 1.8% 
(Cline, 1984, p. 13). This implies a net loss of $21 billion 
from the trend in real exports (with no price changes), given 
the average shortfall for the two years (Cline, p. 13). 
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As shown in Table 2.4 the combined effect of these 
exogenous factors (on an ex ante, or potential basis) was to 
increase the debt of non-oil developing countries by $401 
billion over the 1973 to 1982 time period (Cline, 1984, 
p. 13). Table 2.4 shows the actual increases in debt over the 
time periods in question. 
Table 2.4 
Effects of Exogenous Shocks on External Debt on Non-oil 
Developing Countries 
Effect I 
Oil Prices increase in excess of U.S. inflation, 1974-82 cumulative 
Real interest rate in excess of 1961-80 average: 1981 and 1982 
Te:cns-of-Trade loss, 1981-82 
Export volmne loss caused by world recession, 1981-82 
Total 
Memorandum Items 
Total Debt: 1973 
1982 
Increase: 1973 - 1982 
Amount 
$260 
$41 
$79 
$21 
$401 
$130 
$612 
$482 
Note. From Cline, 1984, p. 13. Net oil importers only. 
Although these numbers can not be directly identified 
with actual increases in debt (because countries did pursue 
adjustment measures to reduce external deficits and debt from 
levels they would otherwise would have reached) these figures 
do however show the exogenous factors of two oil shocks, 
abnormally high interest rates, declines in the terms of 
trade for these developing countries, and falling export 
volume associated with the global recession did play a 
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dominant role in the debt crisis of non-oil exporting 
developing countries. 
What about the oil exporters such as Mexico, Venezuela, 
and Nigeria? Didn't they profit from these high prices and 
enjoy lower debts than they would otherwise would have 
incurred (George, 1988, p. 29). Didn't relatively higher 
revenues from oil exports, at least help to prevent the $260 
billion debt increase from growing even more (George, p. 29)? 
According to Susan George, probably not. First, 
countries like Mexico borrowed heavily in order to develop 
their oil industry (George, 1988, p. 29). PEMEX, the Mexican 
state oil corporation had to borrow $20 billion in 1982 (one-
fourth of the Mexican debt) just to keep its program running 
(George, p. 29). Second, the more oil a country had, the 
more banks were anxious to push their money at it, confident 
in the belief that oil reserves would ensure repayment. 
uwithout black gold in the ground Nigeria, for one, wouldn't 
have looked much like a good credit risku (George, p. 29). 
After the calamities (e.g.: the severe debt 
accumulation, etc.) the IMF/WB started new adjustment 
programs for these countries. The IMF/WB attributed 
difficulties to serious internal distortions. In the eyes of 
the IMF/WB, the only reasonable solution was to alter the 
economic atmosphere of these developing countries. They 
sought to make the market free of inefficiencies. 
Were the behaviors of these countries the cause of their 
difficulties in the early 1980s? As the data shows, these 
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countries were making great strides in export production 
during the 1970s. They were converting their economies from 
the WB/IMF's opinion of a "bad" or ineffective development 
strategy, namely import-substituting industrialization (ISI) 
to export-led industrialization (ELI). 
It is difficult to blame these economies' problems on 
some product protection, import quotas, or price 
controls/subsidies. In many cases, these countries needed to 
protect their inf ant industries against "dumping" and other 
untoward practices of the multi-national corporations. 
Opening an economy entirely up to the market can be deadly, 
discussed in Chapter 3 in my country analysis section. 
The IMF/WB got the issues wrong. Exogenous factors 
played a serious role in determining the development process 
of the developing countries. Internal policies needed to be 
analyzed and perhaps altered in many cases. But to blame 
internal policies for all of the difficulties that the 
underdeveloped nations faced in early 1980s is not realistic, 
and led to counter productive "adjustment" programs. 
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Chapter 3: 
Country Analysis of Chile and Mexico After the 
Implementation of IMF /WB Programs. 
During the 1970s, international lending by banks and 
multi-lateral agencies increased twelve fold (Walton and 
Seddon, 1994, p. 98). Latin America and the Caribbean 
absorbed nearly one-half of the borrowed funds (Walton and 
Seddon, p. 98). Countries in Latin America, namely 
Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico have consistently been among 
the world's largest debtor countries ranked by the absolute 
size of their external obligations. 
Despite the IMF/WB's opinion that the problems of Latin 
American countries were attributable to unrelated "poor" 
policies in individual countries, the IMF recommended 
virtually the same reforms to all of Latin America: 
Devaluation, reduction in fiscal deficits, and the reduction 
in real wages (usually done by freezing nominal public sector 
wages -- and therefore indirectly public sector real wages) 
(Pastor, 1993, p. 297). "In addition the Fund argued for the 
relaxation of controls on trade and capital flows in the 
international sphere, as well as the elimination of subsidies 
and other interference" (Pastor, p. 297). 
Indeed the only price the IMF wished to be regulated was 
the price of labor. Unfortunately, these wage reductions 
yielded little export advantage because developed countries 
were stagnant, and because every other developing country was 
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practicing the same policies (Pastor, p. 297). A reason 
behind this wage suppression was to inhibit excess aggregate 
demand. But this would not be necessary when domestic 
consumption was already contractionary due to a collapsing 
export market (due to other countries also increasing export 
levels as well as the economic slowdown in the "North") 
(Pastor, p. 298). 
All of these measures were done to remove any 
"distortions," in order to allow the market to alleviate any 
economic difficulties. It seems that the IMF/WB are placing 
a lot of faith in the "magic of the market." 
Chile 
Chile is perhaps the country with the longest running 
SAP in the world (Bello, 1994, p. 42). This SAP was placed 
into a society which at the time was characterized as 
implementing heavy interventionist policies (Bello, p. 42). 
The program took on the characteristics of a typical 
structural adjustment and stabilization program, including: 
financial liberalization, monetary devaluation, export 
oriented industrialization, privatization, and deregulation 
(Solimeno, 1994, p. 130). 
Prior to the stabilization and structural adjustment 
procedures, Chile succeeded in modernizing its institutions, 
fostering social mobility, and brought about economic 
progress (Ffrench-Davis and Munoz, 1994, p. 281). It was 
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also known for having one of the most equal income 
distributions in Latin America. 
Previous presidents of Chile embraced the idea of a 
mixed economy. This means an active state which promotes 
private investment and ensures the social well-being of the 
lower and middle classes (Ffrench-Davis and Munoz, 1994, p. 
281). However, when General Pinochet overthrew the 
democratically elected government of Chile in 1973, he 
embraced the free-market and monetarist ideologies (Ffrench-
Davis and Munoz, p. 280). He soon began a transformation of 
the Chilean economy with the help of the World Bank and the 
IMF. His idea was to make the economy more laissez-faire 
(with the exception of a 1982-5 bailout when the state came 
to the aid of a bankrupt financial sector) and more open to 
the international community (Ffrench-Davis and Munoz, p. 
281). 
By the end of the 1980s the Chilean economy had indeed 
gone through a transformation. Some six-hundred state 
enterprises had been sold off with fewer than 50 remaining in 
domestic hands (Bello, 1994, p. 42). By the end of the 
"adjustment" procedure, Chile was transformed into one on the 
most "free market" countries in the Third World (Bello, p. 
42). Foreign investors saw an opportunity to take large 
portions of the former state enterprises. They took control 
over key industries such as telecommunications, airlines, and 
steel production (Solimeno, 1994, p. 130). 
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Unfortunately, this privatization mainly favored the upper 
class. Pinochet sold off these enterprises at "slashed" 
prices to his "Chicago boy" clients (Taylor, 1994, p. 49). 
Also, the economy indeed became more integrated into the 
international economy. In 1970, 35% of the nation's GDP was 
comprised of export earnings (Bello, 1994, p. 42). By 1990, 
the figure had risen to 57% (Bello, p. 42). 
This new export-led industrialization (ELI) strategy by 
definition encouraged the export of their goods in which they 
had a comparative advantage: Natural resources. This was in 
contrast to Chile's previous development strategy ISI, which 
favored manufacturing sectors such as metal working and other 
related enterprises. As seen in Table 3.1 the manufacturing 
sector decreased from 26% in the 1960s, to 20% in the 1980s 
(Ffrench-Davis and Munoz, 1994, p. 287). 
Did this transformation help the economy? Many have 
reported the Chilean experiment in structural adjustment a 
great success. The Chilean economy saw a rapid rise in 
exports, a positive trade balance, increased foreign 
investment, and a relatively low inflation rate 
(International NGO, 1994, p. 51). With the growing export 
sector of the economy (as shown in Table 3.1), Chile has been 
cited as "South America's tiger," a comparison with Korea and 
Taiwan (International NGO, p. 51). These have been 
guideposts in determining the success of a structural 
adjustment program. But a closer look at the numbers leads 
me to a different conclusion. 
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Table 3.1 
Growth Rates and GDP shares of Manufacturing, Exports 
and Agriculture in Chile 
Period 
1950-61 
1961-71 
1971-74 
1974-81 
1981-89 
Period 
1950-61 
1961-71 
1971-74 
1974-81 
1981-89 
Annual Growth Rates 
Manufacturing Agriculture 
4.8 1.8 
6.0 2.9 
-1.6 -1.8 
-1.0 1.8 
2.6 3.1 
GDP Shares 
Manufacturing Agriculture 
22.2 11.8 
25.4 9.6 
27.2 8.3 
22.0 8.6 
19.3 8.8 
Exports of Goods 
and Services 
2.6 
3.2 
8.4 
9.4 
7.3 
Exports of Goods 
and Services 
12.3 
12.0 
9.9 
20.2 
28.1 
Note. Percentages based on 1977 prices. From R. Ffrench-
Davis and o. Munoz, 1994, p. 287. 
The Organization for European Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) asserted that the costs of the Chilean SAP 
were among the largest in Latin America (Solimono, 1994, 
p. 131). 
Others agree with the OECD. Walden Bello suggests if we 
were to gauge the success of the program by the economic 
growth rates it would be deemed a failure. The growth rate 
during the 1974-89 period (after the installment of the 
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adjustment program) averaged only 2.6% per year, which was 
much worse than the growth rates experienced under the ISI 
period (Bello, 1994, p. 43). Those growth rates were: 4% 
per year in 1950-61 period and 4.6% per year in the 1961-71 
period (Bello, p. 43). 
The detrimental effect on the growth rate was not the 
only negative effect on the Chilean economy. "The 
combination of a lower rate of investment and the draconian 
trade liberalization resulted in de-industrialization: The 
manufacturing sector lost ground, declining from an average 
of 26% in GDP in the late 1960s to an average of 20% in the 
late 1980s" (Bello, 1994, p. 44). Since then he 
manufacturing sector has failed to reach its previous levels. 
It was not until 1988 that the industrial value-added 
surpassed the absolute level attained in 1974 (Solimeno, 
1994, p. 130). 
Even though the Chilean economy showed a more consistent 
growth pattern through the mid to late 1980s, few benefited. 
The philosophy behind the program was that the "free market" 
would inspire entrepreneurship, and this would foster growth 
which would trickle-down to the people of the lower economic 
strata (International NGO, 1994, p. 51). Despite their 
beliefs, these economic "improvements" have primarily been 
enjoyed by the economic elite (International NGO, p. 51). 
The gap between the rich and the poor sectors was amplified. 
This was done in part through a cutback in government 
spending (24% of government expenditures were cut), a tough 
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freeze on wages, and a massive devaluation of the Chilean 
peso (Bello, 1994, p. 44). 
This gap between the rich and the poor is seen through 
the increase in the proportion of families living below the 
line of destitution (Bello, 1994, p. 44). This figure rose 
from 12% to 15% (Bello, p. 44). Also the number of people 
living above the line of destitution but below the poverty 
line increased from 24% to 26% (Bello, p. 44). By the 
beginning of the 1990s, 41% (26% plus 15%) of the population 
were living below the poverty line. 
Also during this time period, income distribution became 
even more skewed. The income share of the poorest 50% 
declined from 20.4% to 16.8%, and while the share going to 
the richest 10% went up from 36.5% to 46.8% (Bello, 1994, p. 
45). 
These adjustments have caused Chile to fall deeper into 
the "debt trap." Chile's external debt of 
US$ 19 billion was higher than it had been at the start of 
the debt crisis in 1982 (Bello, 1994, p. 42). Total debt 
stood at 49% of GNP in 1991 and at the time 9% of GNP was 
flowing out of the country to service the debt (Bello, 
p. 42). 
In addition to the working class, the environment was 
also taking a hit. The effects on the environment have been 
dramatic. "The economic growth of Chile has taken place at 
the expense of the environment ••• The so called export boom 
was based on the use and abuse of natural resources, 
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permitting the degradation of the eco-system greater than 
their ability to regenerate" (Spalding, 1992, p. 49). 
Mexico 
Mexico is another country that has been touted as the, 
"vanguard of structural reform in Latin America" (Bello, 
1994, p. 37). But, as is the case with other Latin American 
countries another conclusion might be drawn from the data. 
The Mexican government agreed to an SAP in 1983 after 
the full effects were known about Mexico's debt difficulties. 
A seven year plan was developed and was supposed to provide 
sustained growth through the reduction of state 
interventions, otherwise known as "market distortions," as 
well as to stabilize the economy. The Mexican difficulties 
was blamed (by the IMF and WB) on a "bad" development 
strategy that the Mexican government had pursued in the past 
(Ros and Lustig, 1994, p. 273). As Table 3.2 shows, this 
opinion is difficult to prove when looking at real GDP growth 
rates. 
It was believed that price and financial stability would 
be gained through drastic and permanent cuts in government 
spending, as well as a currency devaluation against hard 
currencies (Ros and Lustig, 1994, p. 273). 
Has the SAP been sufficient in delivering debt relief to 
the Mexican economy? Even as late as the 1989 debt reduction 
agreement and the agreement reached in early 1995, there was 
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only a rescheduling of debt program rather than actual debt 
reduction. 
In 1989, the IMF and the U.S. wanted Mexico to reduce 
their debt to the u.s. by US$7 billion (Bello, 1994, p. 37). 
But, during the loan process, Mexico had to borrow another 
US$7 billion to collateralize the debt fully (Bello, p. 37). 
What Mexico ended up with was a 30 year rescheduling of their 
old debt and their new debt. 
Two years later the Mexican debt was US$98 billion which 
was US$3 billion more than the figure in 1989 (Bello, 1994, 
p. 37). However, as a percentage of GDP, a mild reduction 
occurred; a decrease from 53% in 1989 to 48% in 1991 (Bello, 
p. 38). 
In addition, Mexico was also one of the first countries 
to undergo the privatization program under the WB guidelines. 
These efforts, by some accounts, have failed. Instead of 
improving efficiency, re-distributing wealth and breaking up 
monopolies, many distortions were transferred to the elite, 
instead of actually eliminating the distortions. Carlos 
Heredia, an ex-deputy director of Mexico's Ministry of 
Finance, stated that uMexican privatization basically 
transformed public monopolies into private ones" (Avery, 
1994, p. 97). 
Heredia further asserts that, uprivatization has 
worsened the already steep concentration of wealth in the 
country. Along with structural adjustment policies in 
general, privatization has benefited the friends of President 
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Carlos Salinas." (Avery, 1994, p. 97) The privatization 
efforts were supposed to improve the fiscal standing of the 
government, demonstrate the government's commitment to the 
private sector, improve efficiency of entrepreneurs, 
eliminate monopolies, and add to the quality of the private 
sector (Avery, p. 97). According to Heredia, the government 
has achieved the first two objectives but has forgotten the 
rest (Avery, p. 97). 
For example, the Mexican telephone company (Telmex), was 
a government organization which was sold to a private 
entrepreneur Carlos Slim (Avery, 1994, p. 98). Slim was a 
close personal ally of President Salinas. Herendia says the 
transfer, "illustrates how the Mexican privatization has 
benefited a few private capitalists at the expense of 
consumers" (Avery, p. 98). Also reportedly the industry has 
not improved efficiency either. The telephone rates have 
skyrocketed and also much needed improvements in the system 
have not been made (Avery, p. 98). 
But have these reforms at least helped the country? 
Probably not. As Table 3.2 indicates, the country has failed 
to achieve the growth rates they had achieved under an ISI 
development strategy. The period following the SAPs has been 
characterized as an era of stagnation and declining 
standards of living. Also, fixed investment declined from 
21% of GDP in the 1970-1981 period to 18% in the 1982-1985 
period (Lustig, 1992, p. 234). 
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Table 3.2 
Growth Rates of Real Gross Domestic Product in Mexico, 
Selected Years, 1965 to 1993 
Year{s} Growth Rate 
1965-1980 6.5 % 
1980-1986 0.4 
1987 1.9 
1988 1.2 
1989 3.3 
1990 4.4 
1991 3.6 
1992 2.7 
1993 0.4 
Note. From R.A. Blecker, 1995, p. 8. Figures were from World 
Development Report 1965-1986; for 1987-1993 calculated from 
IMF's International Financial Statistics. 
The failure of the SAP to stabilize the Mexican economy 
is known since the financial crisis that ensued from the 1995 
collapse of the peso has already caused a sharp reduction in 
real wages as well as environmental difficulties (e.g.: 
deforestation, water pollution, and air pollution). 
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Chapter 4: Conclusions 
After the implementation of the structural adjustment 
programs in the early 1980s, few countries have prospered. 
As in the cases of the Latin American countries discussed 
above, income distributions have worsened, inflation has not 
been curtailed, real wages have fallen, and balance of 
payment difficulties have in many cases not improved. 
The facts do not support the opinion of the world Bank 
and the International Monetary Fund, that all of the 
difficulties the underdeveloped world experienced were due to 
endogenous factors such as "bad" development strategies and 
improper governmental operations. 
In addition, the policies that the IMF and the WB lays 
out are flawed in their reasoning. As discussed in 
Chapter 1, these policies are not equipped fundamentally to 
deal with the problems they set out to solve. It seems that 
the main concern of the IMF/WB is to ensure that these 
countries are "corrected" is such a way that they are at 
least able to pay their loan payment, and are vulnerable in 
such a way that their resources can be extracted to benefit 
the North as well as their multi-national corporations. This 
is in contrast to what should be their true goal, of actually 
alleviating the difficulties that these countries face. 
The IMF and the World Bank need to seriously reevaluate 
the soundness of their policies. They also need to get other 
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) who deal directly with 
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these underdeveloped nations and who know full well what 
their difficulties, the NGOs also need to be fully involved 
in the development of a more reasonable set of guidelines. 
Table A.1 
Table A.2 
Table A.3 
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Appendix 
Socio-economic indicators for major Latin 
American Countries 
Socio-economic indicators for major Latin 
American Countries (continued) 
Latin America Under the IMF: Behavior of Certain 
Key Economic Variables 
Table A.1: 
Socio-econom
ic indicators for m
ajor Latin Am
erican co
u
ntries 
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1 
Argentina 
32,322 
76 
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1,529 
88 
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63,930 
0 
·r-1 
.µ 
2 
Boliva 
7,313 
40 
51 
64 
232 
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675 
co N 
3 
Brazil 
150,368 
50 
77 
622 
110 
320 
87,722 
·r-1 
.
.
.
-! 
4 
Chile 
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72 
86 
1,075 
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240 
242 
·r-1 
.
.0 
5 
Colom
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31,819 
54 
70 
437 
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305 
co 
.µ 
6 
Costa Rica 
3,015 
38 
54 
1,308 
48 
241 
219 
ti) 
7 
Dom
inican Republic 
7, 170 
35 
60 
466 
75 
165 
426 
8 
Ecuador 
10, 781 
37 
57 
926 
75 
379 
658 
9 
El Salvador 
5,252 
39 
44 
326 
34 
172 
288 
10 
Guatem
ala 
9, 196 
34 
42 
245 
330 
200 
190 
11 
Haiti 
6,504 
18 
30 
108 
174 
156 
116 
12 
Honduras 
5, 139 
26 
44 
570 
45 
270 
151 
13 
Jam
acia 
2,521 
38 
52 
1,467 
28 
208 
185 
14 
M
exico 
88,598 
55 
73 
970 
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278 
1,405 
15 
Nicaragua 
33,871 
43 
60 
1,873 
67 
1,758 
*
*
 
16 
Panam
a 
2,418 
44 
55 
1,576 
49 
63 
102 
17 
Paraguay 
4,277 
36 
47 
523 
125 
2, 133 
249 
18 
Peru 
22,332 
52 
70 
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69 
348 
88,733 
19 
Trinidad/Tobago 
1,283 
30 
69 
1,431 
29 
91 
159 
20 
Uruguay 
3,218 
81 
83 
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92 
184 
1,794 
21 
Venezuela 
19,735 
70 
90 
1,352 
26 
197 
480 
Note: Taken from
 J. W
alton &
 D. Seddon ( 1 9 94) 
Table A.2: Socio-econom
ic indicators for m
ajor Latin Am
erican Countries (Continued) 
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Earnings Per Em
ployee 
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ent spending 
U
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ployee 
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(1980=100) 
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Education 
H
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rO a 
0 
1970-80 
1980-88 
1988 
1972 
1989 
1972 
1989 
·r-1 
+> rO N 
1 
Argentina 
-1.5 
1.4 
97 
20.0 
9.3 
** 
2.0 
·r-1 
r-l 
2 
Boliva 
0.0 
-10.3 
46 
31.3 
20.3 
6.3 
6.6 
·r-1 
.
.0 
3 
Brazil 
4.0 
0.0 
109 
8.3 
4.2 
6.7 
6.1 
rO 
+> 
4 
Chile 
8.1 
-1. 7 
105 
14.3 
10.1 
8.2 
5.9 
U
l 
5 
Colom
bia 
-0.2 
3.2 
115 
** 
** 
** 
** 
6 
Costa Rica 
** 
** 
** 
28.3 
17.0 
4.0 
27.2 
7 
Dom
inican Republic 
-1.0 
-4.4 
79 
14.2 
** 
11. 7 
** 
8 
Ecuador 
3.3 
-1.3 
95 
27.5 
23.4 
1.5 
9.8 
9 
El Salvador 
2.4 
-9.3 
63 
21.4 
17.6 
10.9 
7.4 
10 
Guatem
ala 
-3.2 
-2.7 
89 
** 
** 
** 
** 
11 
Haiti 
-3.3 
4.6 
157 
** 
** 
** 
** 
12 
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** 
*
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** 
22.3 
** 
10.2 
** 
13 
Jam
acia 
-0.2 
** 
** 
** 
** 
** 
** 
14 
M
exico 
1.2 
-5.2 
72 
16.4 
12.3 
4.5 
1.7 
15 
Nicaragua 
** 
-10.0 
31 
16.6 
** 
4.0 
** 
16 
Panam
a 
0.2 
3.2 
123 
20.7 
19.1 
15.1 
19.8 
17 
Paraguay 
** 
** 
** 
12.1 
11.4 
3.5 
3.0 
18 
Peru 
** 
-3.0 
95 
23.6 
15.6 
5.5 
5.5 
19 
Trinidad/Tobago 
** 
** 
** 
** 
** 
** 
** 
20 
Uruguay 
** 
1.0 
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9.5 
79 
16 
4.5 
21 
Venezuela 
3.8 
0.1 
98 
18.6 
19.6 
11. 7 
10.0 
Note: Taken from
 J. W
alton &
 D. Seddon ( 1994) 
Table A.3: 
Latin Am
erica Under IMF 
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ic Variables 
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60.7 
67.1 
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145.1 
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1988 
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w
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-3.8 
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a
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-5.3 
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-4.7 
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-3.4 
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a
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Notes: Taken from
 M. Pastor, 1993, p. 248. 
I 
Stabilization and S.A. 57 
References 
Avery, N. (1994). Stealing from the state. In K. 
Danaher (Ed.), 50 years is enough: The case against the World 
Bank and the International Monetary Fund. (pp. 95-101). 
Boston: South End Press. 
Ayers, R. L. (1983). Banking on the poor: The world 
Bank and poverty. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press. 
Bello, w. (1994). Dark Victory: The united States, 
structural adjustment, and global poverty. Oakland, CA: 
Institute for Food and Development Policy. 
Blecker, R. A. (1995, March). NAFTA, the Peso, and, 
the contradictions of the Mexican economic growth strategy. 
Paper presented at the Eastern Economics Association 
meetings, New York. 
Cline, w. R. (1984). International debt: Systemic risk 
and policy response. Cambridge, Massachusetts: M.I.T. 
Press. 
Cline, w. R. (1994). International economic policy in 
the 1990's. Cambridge, Massachusetts: M.I.T. Press. 
Cooper, R. N. (1992). Economic stabilization and debt in 
developing countries. Cambridge, Massachusetts: M.I.T. 
Press. 
Evans, D. 
policy reform. 
Studies. 
(1991). Institutions. sequencing, and trade 
Sussex Va.: Institute of Development 
Stabilization and S.A. 58 
Fanelli, J. M., Frenkel, R., & Taylor, L. The World 
Development Report 1991: A critical assessment. In UNCTAD 
(Eds.), International Monetary and Financial Issues for the 
1990s. l, (pp. 1-29). New York: United Nations 
Publications. 
Ffrench, R. & Munoz, o. (1992). Economic and political 
instability in Chile. Ins. Teitel (Ed.), Toward a new 
development strategy for Latin America: Pathways from 
Hirschman's thought. (pp. 281-321). Washington: Inter-
American Development Bank. 
George, s. (1988). A fate worse than debt. New York: 
Grove Press. 
George, s. & Sebelli, F. (1994). Faith and Credit: The 
world Bank's secular empire. Colorado: Westview Press. 
Hakkert, R. & Goza, F.W. (1989). The demographic 
consequences of austerity in Latin America. In W.L. Canak 
(Ed.), Lost promises: Debt. austerity, and development in 
Latin America. (pp. 74). Boulder: Westview Press. 
Helinger, G. K. (1990). Trade strategy in medium-term 
adjustment. World Development, 18, 879-897. 
International NGO Forum (1994). World Bank and IMF 
adjustment lending in Chile. In K. Danaher (Ed.), 50 years 
is enough: The case against the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund. (pp. 51-56). Boston: South End 
Press. 
Lustig, N. (1992). Equality and Growth in Mexico. In 
s. Teitel (Ed.), Toward a new development strategy for Latin 
Stabilization and S.A. 59 
America: Pathways from Hirschman's thought. (pp. 219-258). 
Washington: Inter-American Development Bank. 
Pastor, M. (1990). Capital flight from Latin America. 
World Development, 18, (1), 1- 18. 
Pastor, M. (1993). Managing the Latin American debt 
crisis: The International Monetary Fund and beyond. In G. 
Epstein, J. Graham, & J. Nembhard (Eds.), Creating a new 
world economy: Forces of change & plans for action (pp. 
289-313). Philadelphia: Temple university Press. 
Payer, c. (1982). The Bretton Woods twins. Counterspy. 
Ii. (1). 103-111. 
Reed, D. (1992). Diverging views on the adjustment 
decade. In D. Reed (Ed.), Structural adjustment and the 
environment (pp. 21-47). Boulder: westview Press. 
Ros, J. & Lustig, N. (1993). Mexico. In L. Taylor 
(Ed.), The rocky road to reform: Adjustment, income 
distribution, and growth in the developing world (pp. 267-
295). Cambridge: The MIT Press. 
Solimono, A. (1993). Chile. In L. Taylor (Ed.), The 
rocky road to reform: Adjustment, income distribution, and 
growth in the developing world (pp. 129-148). Cambridge: 
The M.I.T. Press. 
Spalding, H. (1992). Devastation in the Southern Cone: 
The inheritance of the nee-liberal years. Latin American 
Issues, 11, 39-55. 
Stabilization and S.A. 60 
Taylor, L. (1986). Economic openness -- problems to the 
century's end. Helsinki: World Institute for Development 
Economic Research. 
Taylor, L. (1994). Stabilization, Adjustment, and 
Reform. In L. Taylor (Ed.), The rocky road to reform: 
Adjustment, income distribution, and growth in the developing 
world (pp. 39-94). Cambridge: The MIT Press. 
Walton, J. & Seddon, D. (1994). Free markets and food 
riots: The politics of global adjustment. Oxford: 
Blackwell Press. 
World Development Report 1988. (1988). New York: 
Oxford University Press. 
World Development Report 1991. (1991). New York: 
Oxford university Press. 
